Housing & Cities
Bill McBride
421 issues · 132 keepers · 7 tier-5 · 125 tier-4
4 tier-5 · 2 tier-4
McBride’s signature claim is that existing-home inventory and months-of-supply are the leading signal for house-price turning points — the lens that let him call the 2006 top, the 2012 bottom, and rebut serial bubble and recession warnings. These are the reference-grade methodology pieces that define his track record and teach the reader how to read inventory data (including why NAR, Redfin, Realtor.com and Altos report different figures), applied each year to the live inventory question.
A focused explainer of McBride's core forecasting tool: months-of-supply as the leading indicator for price changes, currently 4.3 months versus 4.0 in 2019. He lays out the historical supply-to-price relationship and forecasts that if supply nears 4 months in December it could reach 5+ by next June, implying soft prices. Useful standalone methodology piece that names the metric he watches most.
Marks a genuine turning point: October existing-home sales rose to 3.96M SAAR, the first YoY gain since July 2021 after 37+ months of declines, driven by low August-September mortgage rates and weak 2023 comps. McBride adds the key structural insight that months-of-supply (4.2) now exceeds pre-pandemic October 2019 levels because sales fell even more than inventory, despite still-historically-low sales.
McBride's signature methodology piece: using existing-home inventory as the leading signal for house prices, he walks through how inventory let him call the 2006 top, the early-2012 bottom, and rebut bearish 2018-2019 forecasts and Shiller's 'gigantic boom' claim. Establishes the analytic framework that defines his track record before applying it to the 2025 inventory question (up 17.7% YoY in November). High lasting reference value as the clearest statement of his inventory-as-indicator approach.
A flagship synthesis essay laying out McBride's central methodology: inventory is the key signal for housing turning points, illustrated with his documented track record (calling the 2006 top, the 2012 bottom, disputing Shiller in 2018) and an explainer reconciling why NAR, Redfin, Realtor.com, and Altos report sharply different inventory figures (NAR includes pending sales; Redfin counts quick-sold listings). High reference value as a reusable framework for reading housing inventory data.
The strongest of the annual-questions posts: McBride uses inventory as his signature analytical lever, walking through how rising 2005 inventory let him call the 2006 top, the 2011 inventory plunge let him call the 2012 bottom, and steady inventory kept him correctly bullish in 2018-2019. This is a reference-grade restatement of his core method (watch existing-home inventory to time the housing cycle), applied to the 2026 outlook with NAR inventory up 7.5% YoY but still below 2019.
McBride frames himself as data-driven (bearish in 2005, called the 2012 bottom) and dismantles the bullish read of the rising MBA purchase index by recalling 2006-07, when Greenspan wrongly called the bottom because the index rose as failing lenders dropped out and applications concentrated at survivors. He argues the same compositional shift (plus fewer cash buyers) likely explains today's index rise, which still sits ~29% below 2017-19 even as sales run ~25% below that period. A landmark analytic explainer on why a popular indicator misleads. ---
2 tier-5 · 12 tier-4
The analyst who called the mid-2000s bust spends much of this archive arguing why the current cycle will not repeat it: lending standards are sound (most originations to 760+ scores, almost none subprime), homeowners hold large equity, and there will be no wave of distressed sales to cascade into prices. The thread runs through the mortgage-debt-as-percent-of-GDP framework, the quarterly Delinquencies/Foreclosures/REO syntheses, the NY Fed credit-quality readouts, and the career retrospective — all anchored to the ‘compare today to 1978-82, not the bubble’ thesis.
Covers the NY Fed Q3 Household Debt report, using credit-score-of-origination data to argue current underwriting is far stronger than the 2003-06 bubble (two-thirds of new mortgages to 760+ scores, almost none below 620). McBride ties this to his standing 'don't compare this to the bubble, compare to 1978-82' framework, while flagging current-to-late transition rates back at pre-pandemic levels as something to watch. Explainer value beyond a single data point because it carries an interpretive argument.
Multi-source synthesis arguing there will be no foreclosure wave to cascade into price declines like the housing bust, because lending has been solid and most homeowners hold substantial equity (negative equity just 1.8% of mortgaged homes). Pulls together FDIC REO, Fannie/Freddie serious-delinquency rates (near or below pre-pandemic lows), MBA foreclosure data, and ICE foreclosure activity. A substantive, thesis-driven roundup of housing credit health.
McBride updates his signature mortgage-debt-as-percent-of-GDP framework, reprising his prescient 2005 warning and arguing that today is fundamentally different: lending standards are sound (two-thirds of new mortgages to 760+ scores), homeowners have equity and low fixed rates, so there will be no wave of distressed sales and no cascading price declines this cycle. This is the analyst who called the mid-2000s bust laying out his core reference thesis for why the current cycle won't repeat it. Lasting-reference essay with original framing rather than a data print.
Uses the NY Fed Q4 Household Debt report to make a standing argument: recent mortgage originations are dominated by high credit scores (majority above 760, almost none below 620), in sharp contrast to the 2003-2006 bubble, underpinning his thesis to compare today's market to 1978-1982 rather than the bubble-and-bust. Notes current-to-late transition rates back at pre-pandemic levels (a watch item) while foreclosures stay historically low. Reference-value analysis on underwriting quality, not a routine snapshot.
A reference-quality synthesis restating McBride's cycle-long thesis that there will be no foreclosure wave like the post-bubble bust, because lending stayed solid and most owners hold large equity (negative equity at 2% vs 26% in 2009). Pulls together FDIC REO, Fannie REO, MBA delinquencies, and Fannie/Freddie serious-delinquency data, noting a small recent uptick driven partly by resumed VA foreclosures.
Walks through the Q1 NY Fed Household Debt and Credit report, emphasizing that recent mortgage originations remain overwhelmingly high-credit-score (few below 660) unlike the 2003-2006 bubble, which underpins McBride's argument not to compare today's market to the bust. It also flags rising current-to-30-day transition rates back to pre-pandemic levels and a foreclosure uptick driven largely by the end of the VA moratorium. Useful as a credit-quality reference point that contextualizes underwriting versus the bubble era.
Multi-source quarterly synthesis (FDIC, Fannie/Freddie, MBA, ICE) showing REO and serious delinquencies near historic lows even as foreclosure starts/sales tick up YoY. Makes the core structural argument that solid lending standards and high owner equity preclude a bubble-style cascade of distressed sales and price declines. A useful reference piece tying credit health to the no-foreclosure-wave thesis.
Quarterly synthesis across FDIC REO, Fannie REO, MBA delinquencies, GSE serious delinquencies, and ICE foreclosures, anchored by McBride's recurring thesis that even with softening prices there will be NO foreclosure cascade like the bust because lending was solid and homeowners hold substantial equity. It flags the one stress point worth watching: FHA/VA foreclosures rising as COVID-era loss-mitigation expires.
McBride revisits his long-standing argument that the post-2020 housing boom resembles the late-1970s/early-1980s period (solid underwriting, favorable demographics) rather than the mid-2000s bubble, while flagging a key divergence: today's sharply slower population growth and immigration versus the expanding workforce of the early '80s. A framing essay setting up his forecast for how prices behave after a non-bust down cycle. Matters as the analytic lens through which he interprets all his current data.
Quarterly multi-source synthesis (FDIC, Fannie, MBA, ICE) on distress metrics, making the core analytical argument that despite weakening prices there will be no foreclosure surge or cascading price declines like the housing bust, because lending standards stayed solid and most homeowners have substantial equity. Documents historically low but rising REO, delinquencies, and foreclosure starts (with FHA loans as the outlier). A substantive, recurring big-picture risk assessment.
An update of McBride's long-running framework arguing why this housing cycle will not see cascading price declines: unlike the mid-2000s bubble, mortgage debt as a percent of GDP is not elevated, lending standards are sound, and homeowners hold large equity and affordable low-rate mortgages. Carries lasting reference value as a restatement of his core 'no distressed-sale cascade' thesis, anchored to his 2005 bubble call.
A consolidated quarterly synthesis of REO, delinquency, and foreclosure data making McBride's recurring core argument: even with softening prices there will be no housing-bust-style foreclosure cascade because lending standards have been solid and most homeowners hold substantial equity. He documents rising-but-historically-low stress (REO up 26% YoY, foreclosure referrals up 25% to a post-2019 high, FHA foreclosures up 59%) while emphasizing the contrast with 2008's distressed-sales-driven price collapse. A useful standalone reference on why this cycle differs.
The NY Fed Q1 household debt report shows mortgage underwriting still strong (few originations below 660) versus the 2003-2006 bubble, but flags a rising transition rate into serious 90+ day delinquency as a metric to watch for a foreclosure pickup. McBride uses it to reinforce his thesis that the current cycle resembles 1978-82, not the bubble-and-bust, making it more than a routine data note.
A retrospective essay on McBride's nearly 30-year housing-blogging career, recounting his prescient 2005 top call, 2007 recession prediction, the >$1 trillion lender-loss call, the 2012 housing-bottom call, and his repeated pushback against false bubble and recession warnings. It is the definitive statement of his analytical track record and methodology (demographics, inventory, lending standards, rates), with lasting reference value as he begins his final year. ---
1 tier-5 · 8 tier-4
A deep macro thread, much of it carried by guest contributor Tom Lawler, arguing the neutral real rate (R*) has risen back toward pre-financial-crisis norms (~1.5%), so Fed cuts need not pull the 10-year Treasury or mortgage rates down — underpinning McBride’s ‘6-7% new normal’ for 30-year rates. The pieces compare Fed models (LW/HLW, Lubik-Matthes) against market-based TIPS and term-premium estimates and explain counterintuitive rate moves driven by volatility and MBS spreads.
Tom Lawler explains the counterintuitive 72-89bp surge in mortgage rates since the Fed's September 50bp cut, attributing it to a spike in implied rate volatility (MOVE index) and widening MBS option-adjusted spreads layered on rising Treasury yields. McBride extends it with the rising-neutral-rate argument (3.75-4% neutral nominal) underpinning the '6-7% new normal' mortgage-rate thesis. A genuine explainer of a widely misunderstood market move tied to a standing forecast framework.
Lawler's early read projects November existing sales at 4.09M SAAR (above the 3.97M consensus — 'take the over'), paired with a substantive explainer on the neutral interest rate ahead of the FOMC meeting. The neutral-rate section critically compares the NY Fed (LW/HLW), Richmond (LM), and market-based TIPS estimates and argues the HLW model's huge 'other factors' swing likely reflects misspecification. The forecast is routine but the neutral-rate analysis is a useful, opinionated explainer.
Tom Lawler argues the theoretical neutral rate is a real (inflation-adjusted) concept and shows, via Atlanta Fed SOFR option pricing and term-premium-adjusted forward yields, that the market's view of the long-run neutral fed funds rate sits roughly a percentage point above the FOMC median, implying current policy 'is not meaningfully restrictive.' A second section argues the Fed's QT was never a true reversal of QE, since it shed only short-duration reserves while letting SOMA's average Treasury maturity lengthen. Matters because it frames why mortgage rates may be in a 'new normal' higher range rather than poised to fall.
Tom Lawler projects NAR January existing sales at a 4.09M SAAR (down 3.5% MoM, up 2.3% YoY) ahead of the official release, paired with an original analytical essay constructing a market-implied expected 'real' short rate five years out from Kim-Wright term-premium and Cleveland Fed inflation-expectation data. The essay concludes the neutral real rate has returned to pre-financial-crisis norms (~1.5%). Combines a forecast with a genuinely original macro construction.
An explainer arguing, via Tom Lawler and corroborating quotes from BofA and Fed Chair Powell, that the neutral rate has risen meaningfully back toward pre-financial-crisis levels, implying current policy may not be materially restrictive. Sets up the implication that 30-year mortgage rates may stay structurally higher than many expect. A conceptual/forecast framework piece, though the rate implications sit behind the paywall.
Tom Lawler projects October existing sales at a 4.09 million SAAR, then delivers a substantive explainer arguing the "market's" estimate of the neutral real rate (R*) derived from 5-year-forward TIPS yields is biased upward because it ignores term premia. Adjusting for term premia yields a market R* near 1.5%, coincidentally matching the average of the major Fed models (Laubach-Williams et al.). Valuable as an original methodological piece on inferring R* from bond markets.
A full guest essay by economist Tom Lawler dissecting how R* (the neutral real interest rate) is estimated, comparing Fed model approaches (LW, HLW, Lubik-Matthes, Zaman) against market-based TIPS-derived estimates and explaining the real-vs-nominal and CPI-vs-PCE distinctions. Argues the best-guess neutral real rate is ~1.5%, implying the post-December-cut fed funds rate would sit very near the neutral nominal policy rate, and critiques the HLW model's implausible output gap. A reference-quality framework piece on neutral-rate estimation.
Revisits McBride's June 2023 'new normal' thesis that 6-7% 30-year mortgage rates would persist, noting his correct call that long rates would rise even as the Fed cut. Makes the key macro point that Fed rate cuts do not necessarily pull the 10-year Treasury (4.25%) or mortgage rates (6.30%) down with them, and ties to Lawler's neutral-rate analysis. A useful explainer/forecast retrospective, though the detailed continuation is paywalled.
Tom Lawler tracks the March surge and April reversal in current-coupon MBS yields and Treasury spreads, attributing the swings mainly to rate-volatility (MOVE index) moves rather than the GSE MBS-buying announcement, then reviews multiple model estimates of the neutral real interest rate. The neutral-rate model survey (L-W, H-L-W, F-L-P, etc.) and Lawler's critique of the H-L-W output-gap estimates give this lasting explainer value beyond a routine market note. ---
0 tier-5 · 34 tier-4
McBride’s flagship recurring format — the two-part ‘Current State of the Housing Market’ overviews that stitch inventory, sales, starts, prices, mortgage rates and rents into a single where-we-came-from / where-we’re-going read. Across 2024-2026 the through-line hardens: inventory rising sharply while sales sit near multi-decade lows pushes prices under pressure, but without a distressed-sales wave. The clearest running narrative of the housing slowdown.
Part 1 of the mid-November multi-indicator synthesis, leading with McBride's core thesis that inventory and months-of-supply 'tell the tale' for forecasting prices. The public portion covers new listings up 4.9% YoY (Hurricane Milton depressing Florida activity) before the inventory analysis goes paywalled. A substantive recurring framework post anchoring his inventory-first methodology.
Part 2 of McBride's periodic multi-indicator housing synthesis, covering house prices, mortgage rates, and rents (the public portion runs through Case-Shiller's 4.2% YoY and 19th consecutive monthly SA gain before the paywall). These 'Current State' overviews are his signature framework for situating where the market came from and where it's heading. Reference value as a recurring synthesis post even though most detail is paywalled.
First installment of McBride's twice-monthly synthesis snapshot, leading with his core thesis that inventory and months-of-supply tell the tale of the housing market. Notes new listings up only 2% YoY (well below pre-pandemic), with the inventory analysis paywalled; the recurring multi-indicator framework gives it reference value beyond a single data release.
Part 1 of the mid-January state-of-the-market overview, leading with inventory ("inventory usually tells the tale") and months-of-supply, plus new listings up only 0.9% YoY and still well below pre-pandemic norms. The inventory-first framework is McBride's signature analytical lens and the most durable part of these overviews. Substantive multi-indicator synthesis despite a paywalled active-inventory section.
Part 2 of the periodic multi-indicator state-of-the-market overview, covering house prices (Case-Shiller up 3.6% YoY, 21st straight MoM SA increase), mortgage rates, and rents, tying them to McBride's 2025 outlook questions. These recurring "where we came from, where we are, where we're going" syntheses are among his most reference-worthy posts, though the bulk here is paywalled. Substantive synthesis framing earns tier-4 even with the gated section.
First half of the mid-April multi-indicator overview, framed around a downgraded 2025 housing outlook as tariffs and a ~20% stock-market drop hit buyer wealth; McBride goes on 'Recession Watch' while stressing 'inventory, inventory, inventory' as the key tell. Reviews inventory, starts, and sales with Realtor.com data showing new listings up 10.2% and active up 28.5% YoY. Substantive synthesis tying housing to the broader macro/policy shock.
Second half of McBride's periodic multi-indicator housing overview, covering house prices, mortgage rates, and rents; notes Case-Shiller up 4.1% YoY with a 24th straight MoM SA increase. Captures the real-time tariff/recession whiplash (Goldman's flip from a recession baseline back to non-recession within the same afternoon). Substantive synthesis even though the deeper analysis is paywalled.
First of a two-part synthesis framing the core existing-home story: inventory rising sharply (active listings up 30%+ YoY, over 1 million for-sale for the first time since 2019) while sales stay flat, putting prices under pressure without a distressed-sales wave. Pulls together Realtor.com data to argue inventory will return to 2019 levels by year-end. A multi-indicator overview post, though the bulk is paywalled.
Part 2 of McBride's periodic comprehensive 'Current State of the Housing Market' synthesis, covering house prices, mortgage rates, and rents and building toward his 2025 outlook—the through-line being that sharply rising inventory plus flat sales will keep prices under pressure without a distressed-sales wave. These multi-indicator overview posts are his most reference-worthy format, though most of the price/rate/rent analysis here sits behind the paywall.
First half of the mid-June overview, framing the central thesis: existing-home inventory is rising sharply (active listings +31.5% YoY, topping 1M for the first time since 2019) while sales stay near 2024's multi-decade lows, so prices face downward pressure. Opens with Toll Brothers' 'not a good spring' to characterize the new-home side. A periodic synthesis post with lasting orientation value.
Second half of the mid-June state-of-the-market synthesis, covering house prices, mortgage rates, and rents on top of Part 1's inventory/sales read. Argues that sharply rising inventory plus flat sales will keep prices under pressure (without a distressed-sales wave), with real-time Case-Shiller deceleration. A multi-indicator overview with a forward view, though much detail sits behind the paywall.
Part 1 of the mid-July housing overview lays out the core thesis: existing-home inventory is rising sharply while sales stay flat (2024 was the lowest since 1995), so prices are under pressure with no distress wave; builders are cutting prices at a record 37% rate. It tracks Realtor.com inventory up 28.9% YoY and on pace to close the pre-pandemic gap by fall. The synthesis of supply, sales and builder behavior into a coherent market read gives it strong reference value.
Part 2 of McBride's recurring multi-indicator housing overview, focused on house prices, mortgage rates and rents. It documents the steady deceleration of Case-Shiller (4.2% Jan to 2.7% April YoY) plus two consecutive SA monthly declines, and emphasizes the lag in the data. The synthesized 'where we came from / where we're going' framing makes the overview series worth reading despite the paywall cutoff.
Part 1 of the mid-August housing overview, covering inventory, starts and sales: active listings up 24.8% YoY (third month above 1 million) but inventory growth decelerating after 21 straight months of gains, while sales stay near 1995 lows, pushing months-of-supply up and prices under pressure. Sets the frame that builders face rising completed/unsold inventory and are cutting prices. A periodic state-of-the-market synthesis with lasting reference value.
Part 2 of McBride's signature mid-August housing synthesis, covering house prices, mortgage rates and rents after Part 1's inventory and sales review. Argues prices are under pressure with Case-Shiller decelerating (4.2% YoY in Jan to 2.3% in May, three consecutive monthly SA declines) and emphasizes the significant lag in the index. Useful as a periodic where-we-are/where-we're-going reference, though most price detail sits behind the paywall.
Part 1 of the flagship overview covers inventory, starts, and sales, with the central thesis that inventory rose sharply while sales fell, putting prices under pressure such that existing-home prices will likely be down YoY by end-2025 (without a distressed-sales wave). It also notes the inventory recovery is stalling (active listings 14.3% below 2017-19 norms and the gap widening) and a disappointing year for builders. A high-value multi-indicator synthesis with a clear turning-point call.
Part 2 of McBride's flagship multi-indicator housing overview covers prices, rates, and rents, arguing prices will likely be down YoY by end-2025 with two opposing forces (falling mortgage rates vs. rising unemployment) and citing Cotality's note that July price declines previously only occurred in 2022 and 2006-2008. A substantive synthesis post with a clear directional thesis, though the deeper data sits behind the paywall.
First half of the mid-October market overview, focused on inventory, starts and sales: the year's key story is that inventory rose sharply (active listings up 17% YoY, the 23rd consecutive monthly gain, though growth is decelerating and remains ~14% below 2017-19 norms) while sales are down slightly YoY off 2024's lowest level since 1995, putting prices under pressure. The consolidated supply-and-sales picture and the explicit conclusion that prices will likely be down YoY by end-2025 make it a substantive periodic synthesis.
Second half of McBride's twice-monthly state-of-the-market synthesis, covering house prices, mortgage rates and rents: the Case-Shiller National YoY has decelerated steadily (4.2% in January to 1.7% in July) with five consecutive seasonally-adjusted MoM declines, pointing to YoY price declines by end-2025, while two opposing forces — falling mortgage rates and rising unemployment — cloud the path. The multi-indicator overview framing and explicit price-trajectory call give it lasting reference value among CR's routine releases.
Part 1 of the mid-November overview frames the year's key story: existing-home inventory rose sharply (active listings up 15.3% YoY, 24th straight month of gains) while sales stayed weak (2024 was the lowest since 1995), putting prices under pressure, with starts and new-home-sales data missing due to the government shutdown. McBride concludes existing prices will likely be down YoY by year-end. A multi-indicator state-of-the-market synthesis.
Part 2 of McBride's mid-November housing overview synthesizes house prices, mortgage rates, and rents, documenting steadily decelerating Case-Shiller YoY gains (4.2% in January down to 1.5% in August) and a data lag that means prices are likely to turn negative YoY by year-end 2025. A multi-indicator synthesis post that consolidates the housing picture rather than reporting one release.
Opening half of the mid-December market overview, focused on inventory and sales, with the key story being inventory rising sharply (nearly back to pre-pandemic levels) while sales stay depressed and track 2024 (the lowest since 1995), keeping prices under pressure. Notes that the government shutdown has left starts and new-home-sales data missing, and that homebuilders face a glut of completed and under-construction unsold homes. A useful framing synthesis even though detail is paywalled.
Second half of McBride's semi-monthly multi-indicator synthesis, covering house prices, mortgage rates and rents and framing the two opposing forces (falling mortgage rates vs. rising unemployment at 4.6%) acting on prices. Documents the steady year-over-year deceleration in Case-Shiller (4.2% in January down to 1.3% in September) and the data lag, concluding prices will likely be roughly flat YoY by year-end. Substantive cross-indicator analysis, though the bulk sits behind the paywall.
Part 1 of the flagship mid-January overview, focused on inventory and sales: active listings up 12.1% YoY (26th straight month of gains, still ~12.5% below 2017-2019 norms), sales the lowest since 1995, and homebuilders sitting on elevated completed/under-construction inventory and cutting prices. Also announces McBride has discontinued daily blog posts while continuing the newsletter, and digs into why inventory measures diverge across sources. The synthesis anchor of the two-part series.
Part 2 of McBride's flagship periodic housing overview, covering house prices, mortgage rates, and rents on top of Part 1's inventory/sales synthesis. Frames the year's core thesis: sharply higher inventory plus the lowest sales since 1995 mean prices are under pressure, but no distressed-sale wave since owners hold substantial equity and low rates. The free portion is partial (most price detail paywalled), but this is the multi-indicator synthesis post the series is built around.
Opening half of the mid-February housing overview, arguing that months-of-inventory has returned to pre-pandemic levels via rising listings and sluggish sales, so a YoY price decline is plausible sometime in 2026 without a distressed-sales wave, and that 2026 looks difficult for homebuilders. Reconciles divergent inventory measures (Realtor.com active listings up 10% YoY, the 27th straight monthly gain but decelerating) across sources. A substantive multi-indicator synthesis with explicit calls.
Second half of McBride's twice-yearly housing overview, covering prices, mortgage rates, and rents, and restating the core thesis that with months-of-supply back at pre-pandemic levels prices are under pressure but there will be no bust-style cascade of distressed sales given high homeowner equity. Notes Case-Shiller up only 1.4% YoY and trending down with a significant data lag. A substantive multi-indicator synthesis with a forecast frame.
McBride's recurring multi-indicator housing snapshot, arguing months-of-inventory is mostly above pre-pandemic levels so prices are under pressure and could turn negative YoY in 2026, but without a distressed-sales wave given homeowner equity and low rates. It also flags 2026 as a difficult year for builders (elevated completed-but-unsold inventory) and notes shutdown-delayed data plus sharp regional divergence (Northeast still rising). A useful synthesis even though the supply/sales detail is paywalled.
Part 2 of McBride's periodic state-of-housing synthesis, covering prices, rates, rents and the war's negative impact (rising mortgage rates, increased uncertainty, a potential wealth-effect drag if stocks fall further). He restates the core thesis: months-of-supply above pre-pandemic levels and 2025 sales at the lowest since 1995 put prices under pressure, but no cascading bust given homeowner equity and low locked-in rates. Multi-indicator overview with lasting framing value (deeper price/rent detail is paywalled).
First half of the mid-April state-of-the-market overview, covering inventory and sales: months-of-inventory above pre-pandemic levels from rising listings plus sluggish sales (lowest since 1995), pointing to possible YoY price declines in 2026 but no distressed-sale wave. Also flags a difficult 2026 for homebuilders (excess completed/under-construction inventory) and notable regional divergence. A substantive synthesis post anchoring McBride's recurring framework, even though the data detail is paywalled.
Second half of McBride's twice-yearly state-of-the-housing-market overview, covering house prices, mortgage rates, and rents, and laying out the core thesis that prices are under pressure from above-pre-pandemic months-of-supply but will NOT cascade like the housing bust because owners hold substantial equity and low-rate mortgages. A synthesis/framework post (only partly visible, paywalled) tying the recurring data into McBride's no-bust-this-time argument.
The second half of McBride's mid-May housing synthesis covers house prices, mortgage rates and rents, noting Case-Shiller YoY decelerating to 0.7% with a significant data lag and that lower rates lifted purchase applications but not sales. A multi-indicator overview that ties the threads together rather than reporting one release.
Part 1 of the mid-June overview frames the existing-home market's key stories: sales historically low for 3+ years (near 1995 lows), months-of-supply above pre-pandemic levels, but inventory growth slowing sharply, with significant regional divergence. The multi-indicator synthesis and homebuilder outlook give it lasting context value beyond a routine data update.
Part 2 of McBride's twice-yearly housing overview synthesizes house prices, mortgage rates, and rents, noting Case-Shiller national prices up only 0.7% YoY with a significant data lag and a slowing year-over-year trend. As a multi-indicator state-of-the-market synthesis it carries more reference value than single-release posts, though the paywall truncates the back half. ---
0 tier-5 · 15 tier-4
A distinctive recurring lens: McBride deflates Case-Shiller by CPI and adds price-to-rent, price-to-income, and affordability framing to argue that although nominal prices keep setting records, real prices have sat below their 2022 peak for years — his ‘Seven Years in Purgatory’ pattern for how long real prices take to recover after a spike. The series tracks the steady real-terms erosion through 2026 and repeatedly forecasts flat-to-slightly-down prices.
McBride's recurring real-terms house-price analysis, arguing nominal prices are at all-time highs but real prices remain 1.5% below the 2022 peak and ~11% above the 2006 bubble peak, with price-to-rent and affordability framing. It revisits his 'Seven Years in Purgatory' thesis that real prices take years to set new highs after a spike. A distinctive analytical lens (inflation-adjusted, price-to-rent) that recurs as reference, though later sections are paywalled.
Recurring analytical piece converting nominal Case-Shiller prices into real terms, price-to-rent, and affordability: real national prices sit 1.4% below the 2022 peak yet 11.3% above the prior bubble peak, with the price-to-rent index 8.1% below peak. The 'real prices in purgatory' framing and the historical-context lens give it durable interpretive value over a raw price headline.
McBride's recurring real-house-price analysis: nominal indices are at record highs but in real terms the national index sits 1.3% below its 2022 peak and 11.4% above the bubble peak, with the price-to-rent ratio 8.1% below peak. He invokes his "7 Years in Purgatory" framework and forecasts roughly flat nominal (slightly negative real) prices for 2025. The real-terms and price-to-rent lenses are a distinctive, repeatable analytical framework worth reading.
McBride's recurring real-house-price framework: though nominal Case-Shiller is at all-time highs, in real (CPI-adjusted) terms the National index is 1.1% below its 2022 peak and ~11.6% above the 2006 bubble peak, with the price-to-rent ratio 7.8% below peak. He invokes his 'House Prices: 7 Years in Purgatory' thesis that real prices take years to recover post-surge, and guesses mostly-flat nominal prices in 2025 (a slight real decline). A useful analytical lens on valuation, though price-to-rent/affordability detail is paywalled.
A recurring analytical framework piece: in real (CPI-adjusted) terms the Case-Shiller National index sits 1.0% below its 2022 peak and ~12% above the 2006 bubble peak, with the price-to-rent ratio 7.7% below peak. McBride applies his '7 Years in Purgatory' model for how long real prices take to recover and forecasts mostly-flat nominal prices (a slight real decline) in 2025. Valued for the real-price/price-to-rent/affordability lens rather than a single headline number.
McBride's recurring but analytically rich real-house-price piece: nominal Case-Shiller is at all-time highs, but in real (CPI-adjusted) terms the national index sits 0.8% below its 2022 peak (32 months on) and the price-to-rent index 7.4% below, with real prices ~12% above the 2006 bubble peak. Frames the multi-year 'purgatory' it takes for real prices to set new highs and forecasts mostly-flat nominal prices (slight real decline) in 2025. A useful valuation-framework explainer even though price-to-rent and affordability detail is paywalled.
McBride's recurring framework piece converting Case-Shiller into real (inflation-adjusted) terms, price-to-rent, and affordability, showing the national real index is 0.8% below its 2022 peak and ~12% above the bubble peak, 33 months into a 'purgatory' flat-price period. His guess: mostly flat nominal prices in 2025, implying a slight real decline. Valuable as a real-terms analytical lens even though later sections are paywalled.
McBride's recurring real-house-price framework: deflating Case-Shiller by CPI shows the national index 1.0% below its 2022 real peak (34 months without a new real high) and ~12% above the 2006 bubble peak in real terms, with the price-to-rent and affordability lenses added. The analytical framework (nominal vs. real, price-to-rent, '7 years in purgatory') gives this lasting reference value beyond the month's number, though the price-to-rent/affordability detail is paywalled.
Recurring framework piece reframing Case-Shiller in real (CPI-adjusted) terms: the National index is 1.7% below its 2022 peak and ~11% above the 2006 bubble peak, 35 months past the real-price high. Adds price-to-rent and affordability lenses, with McBride guiding to mostly-flat nominal (slightly declining real) prices in 2025. The real-terms/price-to-rent framing is the durable value here, not the single data print.
McBride constructs house-price-to-income ratios using Case-Shiller against Census median household income ($83,730 in 2024) and the Social Security National Average Wage Index, finding prices about 3% below the bubble peak on the income measure but still well above the historical median and near the bubble peak on the wage measure. A methodological explainer of a valuation metric with recurring reference value, concluding prices remain elevated.
McBride's recurring real-house-price analysis, showing the inflation-adjusted Case-Shiller National index 3.0% below its 2022 peak (price-to-rent 10.1% below) after nine consecutive monthly real declines, even as nominal prices sit just 0.7% off all-time highs. Reframes the debate by stressing that real (CPI-adjusted) prices, the price-to-rent ratio and affordability matter more than nominal, with real prices still ~9.4% above the bubble peak. A valuable framework-style explainer despite paywalled charts.
Recurring but analytically rich real-house-price analysis showing the national index 2.7% below its 2022 peak and the price-to-rent index 9.9% below peak, with real prices still 9.7% above the bubble peak. Adds value via the 'real terms matter' framing, the price-to-rent and affordability lenses, and the '7 years in purgatory' historical pattern for prices to recover after a spike.
McBride's recurring real-terms house-price framework: nominal Case-Shiller hit new all-time highs in November, but inflation-adjusted prices remain 2.4% below the 2022 peak (42 months and counting), with the price-to-rent index 9.6% below peak. The '7 Years in Purgatory' framing and real-vs-nominal lens make this more analytically useful than a routine data note, even though the price-to-rent and affordability detail is paywalled. Useful explainer on why nominal highs mask real-terms stagnation.
Recurring real-house-price analysis: nominal Case-Shiller National and Composite-20 at new all-time highs but real prices 2.3% below the 2022 peak (44 months past the real peak), with the price-to-rent index 9.7% below peak. McBride frames the nominal/real distinction, the '7 Years in Purgatory' pattern, and forecasts mostly flat-to-small price declines nationally in 2026. A useful analytical explainer that recasts headline price data in real and price-to-rent terms.
McBride's recurring real-house-price analysis shows inflation-adjusted national prices 3.7% below their 2022 peak (46 months and counting) and the price-to-rent index 10.3% below peak, while nominal prices sit near all-time highs. The real-terms, price-to-rent, and affordability framework with his "7 years in purgatory" reference and a flat-to-down 2026 forecast makes it a useful analytical explainer. ---
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The richest single-source monthly digest McBride relays: ICE’s Mortgage Monitor, woven into multi-indicator readouts of home prices, tappable and withdrawn equity, delinquencies, negative equity, property-insurance costs, first-time-buyer composition, and inventory normalization — often surfacing themes (condo weakness, regional divergence, insurance affordability, emerging homeowner risk) before they appear elsewhere.
A rich multi-topic readout of the ICE Mortgage Monitor: record $11.2T tappable equity with extraction running at half the 10-year norm (a potential rate-cut catalyst), rising delinquencies including 2024-vintage and VA early-stage loans at their highest distress since 2008, and home-price growth cooling to +2.9% YoY for the seventh straight month. Hurricane Helene/Milton exposure on $1T of UPB adds forward context. Denser and more interpretive than a single-indicator post.
Walks through ICE's December Mortgage Monitor: 300K+ refinances closed in Sep-Oct (most in 2.5 years) as rates dipped into the low 6% range, with rate/term volume outpacing cash-outs for the first time in three years and the average refinancer cutting their rate by over a point. Also covers delinquencies (3.45%, slow rise in serious delinquencies) and home-price growth ticking up to 3.0% YoY, making it a useful multi-indicator mortgage explainer.
ICE's December Mortgage Monitor reports 2024 home-price growth finished at +3.4%, the softest calendar-year gain since 2011, with for-sale inventory up 22% (now closing its pre-pandemic deficit toward a mid-2026 'normalization' nationally, though the Midwest/Northeast lag to 2027+). It also tracks rising FHA/VA delinquencies as cycle 'canaries' and the building financial stress from the L.A. wildfires (17,000 homes in the fire path). A meaty multi-indicator synthesis combining price, inventory, and delinquency trends.
Recaps the ICE Mortgage Monitor with a standout finding: average property insurance premiums rose a record +14% ($276) to $2,290 in 2024, the fastest-growing component of monthly home payments, prompting record carrier-switching and higher deductibles. Also covers delinquencies (3.47%, below pre-pandemic), VA-moratorium-driven foreclosure starts hitting a 5-year high, and HPI growth slowing to 3.0% YoY. A multi-indicator monitor anchored by a genuinely notable insurance-affordability trend.
Digests the ICE Mortgage Monitor: first-time buyers a record 58% of agency purchase lending and Gen Z one in four FTHB originations, with FTHBs leaning on low-down-payment FHA/VA loans and showing slower prepays but higher defaults. Also covers cooling prices (HPI +2.4% YoY, early April +1.9%), delinquencies down to 3.21%, and VA-driven foreclosure increases. A multi-indicator mortgage-market roundup with a notable FTHB-composition story.
Walkthrough of the ICE June Mortgage Monitor spanning record $17.6T home equity and a HELOC-withdrawal revival, steady-but-slowly-deteriorating delinquencies (DQ 3.22%, SDQs +14% YoY), sharp inventory normalization (deficit cut to -16%, on track to fully normalize by mid-2026), and decelerating prices (HPI +2.0% YoY April, early-read +1.6% May, condos softening). A multi-indicator synthesis post that ties equity, credit, inventory, and price dynamics together and surfaces the condo-market weakness theme.
Detailed monthly relay of the ICE Mortgage Monitor showing home-price growth slowing to 1.3% YoY in early June and, more notably, emerging pockets of homeowner risk: rising negative equity in recent FHA/VA vintages, growing ARM/buydown usage, and student-loan delinquency raising mortgage-default risk 4x. The condo market (-1.3% YoY, softest since 2012) and inventory-deficit recovery (-13% vs. pre-pandemic) round out a rich multi-indicator picture worth reading.
Rich multi-indicator digest of ICE's August Mortgage Monitor: record tappable equity ($11.6T) and the highest origination volume since 2022 driven by cash-out refis, even as annual home-price growth eased to +1.0% (softest since 2012) and condos turned negative. Flags an inventory turning point (first SA decline in six months) that echoes the 2023 pattern, plus rising FHA delinquencies. Strong synthesis of equity, prices, delinquencies and inventory in one place.
Deep multi-indicator read on the ICE Mortgage Monitor: 2025 home-price growth of just 0.6% (smallest since 2011), a January rate dip to 6.04% that put ~4.8M borrowers in the money to refinance and pushed affordability to a four-year high, and rising negative equity (1.1M underwater, the most since 2018) concentrated in Southern markets where some metros top 10% underwater. Emphasizes widening regional divergence between the stable Northeast/Midwest and the weakening South/West. A rich analytical synthesis with lasting reference value on regional price and equity dynamics.
Detailed digest of ICE's April Mortgage Monitor: annual home-price growth slowed to 0.4% but Feb-March posted the firmest seasonally-adjusted monthly gains in nearly a year, affordability is the best in four years even after a ~40bp rate rebound cut buying power ~4%, inventory is up 8% YoY but still below pre-pandemic, and the rate rebound cut refinance candidates by ~60%. Also covers rising delinquencies (FHA-driven) and the persistent lock-in effect. A data-rich multi-indicator monthly report with strong regional and affordability detail.
The June ICE Mortgage Monitor recap covers home price growth accelerating to 1.0% YoY, equity withdrawals at the highest first-quarter level since 2021 driven by an 18-year high in second-lien lending (the lock-in effect), and a near-record-tight spread between hottest (Northeast) and coldest (Sun Belt) markets. The dense multi-topic data digest on prices, delinquencies, and HELOCs gives it solid analytical breadth. ---
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McBride’s on-the-record forward calls plus the policy essays that revise them: the year-ahead ‘Ten Economic Questions’ posts on prices, residential investment, starts and new-home sales, standalone outlook revisions when policy (zoning, tariffs, immigration, deportations) changed the picture, and his readouts of outside forecasts. The throughline is a supply-and-demand framework with heavy emphasis on regional divergence and the stagflation/unemployment swing factors for 2025-2026.
McBride engages the Ozimek/Lettieri (Economic Innovation Group) "Density Zones" proposal, which would have the federal government publish a standardized zoning/building code that municipalities could opt into for specific areas and earn a per-unit "Density Dividend" for hitting construction targets. He frames housing as fundamentally a supply problem driven by local zoning red tape, notes California's ADU push as insufficient, and adds his own tweaks (size the dividend to local cost-to-income, rename it). A substantive policy essay rather than a data update.
McBride's annual forecast-collection post compiling early 2025 outlooks (Fannie Mae, NAHB and others) alongside his own baseline, with consensus pointing to low-to-mid single-digit price gains, modestly higher new and existing sales, and continued depressed multifamily starts. The forward-looking synthesis and reference-table format give it lasting value as a year-ahead benchmark.
Annual house-price forecast framing 2024's likely 3-4% national gain and laying out the supply-and-demand logic for 2025, stressing that national figures mask sharp regional divergence (Florida/Texas inventory rising). Reviews how median, Freddie Mac, and Case-Shiller indices track each other to anticipate the YoY path. The actual 2025 numeric prediction sits behind the paywall, but the public portion is a substantive forecast setup.
Annual forecast piece projecting 2025 residential investment, housing starts, and new home sales: McBride expects multi-family starts to fall ~5% further, single-family roughly flat (total starts down slightly), and new home sales up ~5% YoY. Grounds the call in under-construction data (1.434M units, fewest since Aug 2021) and the structurally non-distressed nature of this cycle versus the housing bust. A substantive, on-the-record yearly prediction.
A substantive forecast revision: having waited to see enacted policy, McBride now expects tariffs (higher building costs), slower immigration and deportations (less household formation and fewer construction workers), DOGE-driven employment drag, and stock-market wealth effects to weigh on housing. The throughline is higher construction costs plus weaker demand — a framework for reading 2025 starts, sales and prices.
A forecast/synthesis post arguing that with inventory rising and YoY price growth slowing across Case-Shiller, Freddie Mac HPI and ICE, national house prices will be flat-to-slightly-down in 2025 and real (inflation-adjusted) prices down. McBride anchors it in his long-running framework on how many years real prices take to recover from a peak (6.5 yrs after '79, 14.5 yrs after the bubble; now 35 months in). The explicit forecast call plus the real-price-recovery lens give it reference value.
McBride walks through Goldman's mid-2025 forecasts (existing sales 4.1mn, single-family starts down 11% to 0.91mn, national prices up just 0.2% Dec/Dec) and adds his own data and commentary on each, including the mortgage rate lock-in (71% of loans under 5%) and why builders' inventory advantage is fading. The synthesis of an outside forecast against his own indicators, with explicit agreement and a slightly more pessimistic lean, gives it lasting reference value.
McBride's framework post on his most-asked question, layering a stagflation backdrop (rising inflation, weakening employment) onto his usual inventory/sales/months-of-supply lens and introducing the Sahm-rule-vs-Case-Shiller relationship: rising unemployment historically pressures prices. He reaffirms his 'mostly flat to slightly down nationally in 2025' call with regional declines (Austin, Florida) and flags falling rates and rising unemployment as the 2026 swing factors.
Annual forecast post on house prices, reviewing his accurate 'mostly flat in 2025' call and setting up 2026 around the supply-and-demand framework, with leading indicators (NAR median, Freddie Mac HPI) suggesting Case-Shiller YoY stays flat to slightly lower. Emphasizes that national figures mask large regional divergence, with high inventory in some areas and tight supply in the Northeast.
Part of McBride's annual Ten Economic Questions series, forecasting 2026 residential investment, housing starts, and new home sales: RI likely down YoY, multi-family starts to decline (40 straight negative ABI months), single-family roughly flat, total starts down slightly, and new home sales mostly unchanged. Forecast-call content with elevated units-under-construction analysis, hampered by three missing months of shutdown-delayed data. ---
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The existing-home-sales beat above the routine print: the monthly ‘Final Look at Local Housing Markets’ wraps that synthesize 40+ local reports into a forward sales call, Lawler’s early-read forecasts, and — recurringly — the data-integrity catches when the NAR massively revises its regional median prices. The cluster tracks sales stuck near multi-decade lows, months-of-supply climbing past pre-pandemic, and the widening Sun Belt-versus-Northeast divergence.
Synthesizes 40+ local markets into the November story: existing sales rose YoY for only the second time since July 2021 (driven by the lowest mortgage rates in two years when contracts were signed) yet remain ~23% below pre-pandemic levels, with inventory surging in Florida and Texas. Adds a forward call that December sales will likely again be up YoY against a very weak December 2023 base. Multi-indicator local-market synthesis with an explicit forecast, above a routine data snapshot.
Synthesizes the full month of 40+ local market reports for February — inventory up ~22% YoY (concentrated in Florida/Texas), closed sales down ~5.8% NSA, and the first YoY sales decline after four months of gains. McBride then forecasts March existing sales mostly unchanged YoY, factoring in working-day counts and the lagged mortgage-rate pipeline. Useful both as a multi-indicator wrap-up and a forward call.
Pairs Lawler's detailed post-mortem on why his early NAR estimate 'missed' (the NAR's Northeast/South median-price and seasonal-factor numbers look inconsistent with state realtor reports) with McBride's final July wrap: sales ~26% below pre-pandemic, months-of-supply highest for July since 2016, and inventory up 20% YoY. The methodological transparency on NAR data quality plus multi-indicator synthesis lifts it above a routine local update.
McBride's synthesis of post-NAR local market data plus a forward call: September sales bounced (closed sales up ~7.8% YoY in tracked markets) but the SAAR has been stuck near 4 million for almost three years, months-of-supply is the highest for September since 2015, and rising inventory points to possible national price declines later in 2025 or 2026. The multi-indicator stitching (sales, supply, new listings, inventory) plus an explicit early forecast that October sales will be up slightly YoY makes this more than a single-release snapshot.
Comprehensive local-markets synthesis for November pulling together closed sales (down 6.5% YoY in the sample), months-of-supply above pre-pandemic, new listings, and active inventory (up 8.8% YoY), with a forward call that December sales will likely be down slightly YoY. The multi-indicator roll-up plus the explicit 'national price declines possible in 2026' framing lifts it above routine single-release posts.
Tom Lawler documents the NAR again massively revising up its Northeast median existing-home price (a repeat of the July episode), where preliminary data clashed with state realtor reports, warning of likely larger revisions under the NAR's new earlier-release schedule. The second half is a substantive analysis showing that the wider-than-historical primary mortgage/Treasury spread is driven by primary/secondary spreads (guarantee fees, post-GFC servicing costs), not MBS/Treasury spreads, contributing 54 of 57 bp of the rate increase versus 2002-2007. A data-integrity caution plus a useful spread-decomposition explainer relevant to the GSE-MBS-purchase debate.
December Case-Shiller national prices rose just 1.3% YoY (FHFA 1.8%), the weakest full-year gain since 2011, and the post documents a sharp 'year of two halves' (prices up 2.6% in H1, down 1.3% in H2 with all 20 metros negative) alongside widening geographic divergence as Midwest/Northeast markets (Chicago, NY) outperform correcting Sun Belt metros (Tampa, Phoenix, Dallas, Miami). The detailed quote-backed decomposition and regional reordering make it a strong reference point on the 2025 price inflection.
Part 1 of the mid-May overview frames the core 2026 story: months-of-supply above pre-pandemic levels from rising inventory plus sluggish sales (lowest since 1995), putting prices under pressure with a possible YoY decline this year, but no distressed-sale wave given high equity. Includes a forecast call and a tough-year outlook for homebuilders, with regional divergence noted. ---
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The demand side: McBride traces housing demand to demographics and household formation (the 2010 cohort shift that let him call the bottom in rents and multifamily, the 2020-22 formation surge), then explains why a record multifamily-supply wave colliding with weak demand keeps asking rents soft — with immigration policy as an emerging downside. Includes the leading-indicator framing (NMHC tightness, ABI) for multifamily starts and the rents-to-CPI/OER transmission.
Tom Lawler analyzes Census Vintage 2024 estimates, which revise net international migration sharply upward — population growth from July 2021 to July 2024 is ~3.39M higher than Vintage 2023 estimated. Flags a key downstream consequence: because the household employment survey is controlled to Census population, the January benchmark revision should produce a sizable upward jump in household-survey employment. Substantive demographic analysis with cross-domain implications for housing demand and labor data.
Lawler shows that the January employment report's population-control update (Vintage 2024, capturing higher net international migration) raised the Household Survey employment estimate by ~2 million while the Establishment benchmark cut payrolls by 598k, collapsing the long-noted gap between the two surveys from 4.3 million to 1.46 million. The takeaway is that the apparent 'weak labor market' signal from lagging Household Survey growth was a population-undercount artifact, not real weakness. Matters because population/migration estimates are foundational to housing demand forecasting.
McBride uses Census age-cohort data to argue demographics are a primary driver of housing demand, recounting how the 2010 cohort shift let him correctly call the bottom for rents and multi-family construction. The free preview frames the next-decade implications (the analysis itself is paywalled), but the demographic-cohort framework and the documented track-record make it a useful explainer with reference value.
Reports the NMHC quarterly apartment survey, with the Market Tightness Index back above 50 (52) for the first time since July 2022 after ten straight quarters of looser conditions, signaling rents and vacancies may be stabilizing. McBride flags this index plus the Architectural Billings Index as his preferred leading indicators for multifamily starts, while cautioning the survey predates full tariff/policy impact. Useful for the leading-indicator framing on multifamily.
Monthly multi-source rent synthesis (Apartment List -0.3% YoY, Realtor.com -1.2%, Zillow +3.5%) explaining how record multifamily supply and rising vacancies keep asking rents flat, and how new-lease measures feed lagged BLS OER/rent and thus CPI/PCE housing inflation. McBride notes immigration policy and tariffs as emerging downside risks for rents. A useful recurring explainer tying rents to inflation measurement.
A conceptual explainer arguing household formation is the underlying driver of housing demand, tracing ~1.1 million new households/year in 2010-2019, a pandemic-driven 2020 decline of over 100K, and a 2021-2022 surge that confirmed the demand signal seen in rising prices and rents. The free portion is short but the framing is a durable demand-side lens rather than a single data release.
Using FHFA's National Mortgage Database, McBride quantifies the mortgage rate lock-in effect: the share of outstanding loans under 4% peaked at 65.1% (now 52.5%) and under 5% at 85.6% (now 70.4%), while loans over 6% rose to 19.7%, showing the lock-in is eroding over time. This is a substantive structural explainer of why inventory was so constrained and how that constraint is loosening, with lasting reference value.
Demographics explainer using new Census age-distribution estimates, recounting how favorable demographics let McBride call the 2010 bottom in rents and multi-family construction and setting up implications for the next decade (paywalled). Notably flags that the largest age cohorts now appear in their mid-20s, very different from last year's data, raising data-quality questions. A structural/framework-style piece with lasting reference value on the demographics-housing link, despite the cut-off. ---
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A live-policy thread, mostly Lawler, dissecting the Trump/Pulte FHFA push to have Fannie and Freddie buy roughly $200B of MBS: the SPSPA portfolio mechanics, how the GSEs would fund and hedge it, why razor-thin current-coupon spreads make uneconomic buying irrational, and the duration and interest-rate risk the GSEs took on by extending liquidity-portfolio maturities. Granular balance-sheet plumbing unavailable elsewhere, plus a spread-decomposition explainer of why mortgage-Treasury spreads stay wide.
Tom Lawler's pre-NAR projection (4.10M SAAR for November) is the routine part, but the second half is a substantive analysis of unusually tight current-coupon MBS-to-Treasury spreads and the claim that Pulte's FHFA may have directed debt-financed GSE MBS purchases for political talking points despite it being economically irrational for the GSEs. The MBS-spreads/GSE-policy commentary gives this lasting interpretive value beyond a sales preview.
Tom Lawler analyzes Trump's announcement directing Fannie and Freddie to buy $200 billion in MBS, explaining the figure ties to SPSPA portfolio room, how the GSEs would fund and hedge it, and why current-coupon MBS option-adjusted spreads went slightly negative on the news. His core call: $200 billion is trivial versus the Fed's trillion-dollar programs, so any spread impact won't be sustainable and investors should hold an exit strategy. Also dissects Bessent's claim that the funds rate is well above neutral, showing model-implied neutral ranges overlap the current target. Substantive original analysis on a live policy event.
Tom Lawler dissects how Fannie and Freddie funded ~$59B of added MBS holdings in H2 2025 from runoff of short-term liquidity portfolios and analyzes the financing/interest-rate-risk implications if they execute the president's announced $200B MBS-buying plan, including likely ramped debt issuance and pay-fixed swap use. Adds an early read showing banks shed ~$24B in MBS after the January 9 announcement and ties it to the 2023 banking-crisis lessons on duration risk. A substantive, original analysis of GSE balance-sheet mechanics and MBS-market plumbing.
McBride's monthly rent review, opening with a genuinely useful causal narrative: the 2020-21 household-formation surge (roommates splitting up) pulled rent demand forward and triggered a multi-family construction boom, whose delayed deliveries through 2023-25 now collide with weak demand to keep rents soft. He argues 2026 will be another soft-rent year, with immigration policy (deportations, lower legal inflow) adding downward pressure, and cites Apartment List rents down 1.5% YoY and a record 7.4% multifamily vacancy rate. The explanatory framework lifts it above a routine data post.
Detailed pass-through of the ICE March Mortgage Monitor covering several threads: Q4 originations hit a 3.5-year high on a refinance surge (refis nearly 40% of lending, 5.4M refi-eligible borrowers), $205B in 2025 equity withdrawals with the largest second-lien volume since 2007, record-high property insurance costs (with delinquency correlation), and home prices up just 0.4% YoY. The multi-indicator coverage with quantified detail makes it a useful reference on mortgage-market and affordability dynamics.
Tom Lawler dissects the GSEs' February volume summaries, showing combined agency MBS holdings rose only ~$11.3B (smallest since Sept 2025) despite the President's January call for $200B in purchases, arguing the GSEs sensibly avoided uneconomic, negative-risk-adjusted-return buys given razor-thin MBS spreads. He also flags Freddie's sharply rising interest-rate sensitivity from extending its liquidity portfolio duration to 36 months. Substantive expert analysis connecting political pressure, GSE economics, and rate risk.
Tom Lawler dissects a striking divergence in MBS acquisitions between Fannie (+$33.4B YTD) and Freddie (+$11.7B), with combined buying far below the ~$200B implied by the President's January post, and traces both GSEs' sharply higher interest-rate-shock exposure to a deliberate lengthening of liquidity-portfolio duration. Original, granular analysis of GSE balance-sheet behavior unavailable elsewhere. ---
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The recurring quarterly mortgage-equity-withdrawal analysis built on the Fed’s Z.1 Flow of Funds: the ‘Home ATM’ that fueled the mid-2000s bust stays mostly closed, mortgage debt sits in the low-40s percent of GDP (versus a 73% bust peak), and homeowner equity cushions are large — the household-balance-sheet leg of the no-distressed-sale-wave argument.
Quarterly mortgage-equity-withdrawal analysis contrasting today with the bubble-era 'Home ATM': Q3 mortgage debt rose only $105B (versus a $467B Q2-2021 peak), debt is 45.2% of GDP (down from a 73.3% bust peak), and homeowner equity exceeds $17.5T, so equity cushions are large. Reinforces the no-cascading-bust thesis using Fed Flow-of-Funds and CoreLogic equity data. The CR MEW estimate itself is paywalled, but the public framing is substantive macro-housing analysis.
Using the Fed's Z.1 Flow of Funds, McBride shows mortgage equity withdrawal was only slightly positive in Q2 (mortgage debt up $108B) and that mortgage debt is just 44.6% of GDP versus a 73.1% housing-bust peak, so homeowners hold large equity cushions and there's little negative-equity risk. A recurring but analytically meaningful quarterly piece contrasting today's balance-sheet health with the bubble era.
McBride's recurring mortgage-equity-withdrawal analysis using the Fed's Z.1 data: mortgage debt rose $108 billion in Q3 (unchanged from Q2) but MEW was only slightly positive, meaning the 'Home ATM' that fueled the mid-2000s bust remains mostly closed. The key structural point is that mortgage debt sits at just 43.9% of GDP, far below the 73.1% bust peak, so most homeowners hold large equity cushions and there will be no distressed-sale wave. A useful recurring explainer tying current household balance-sheet strength to why this cycle differs from 2008.
Quarterly mortgage-equity-withdrawal analysis from the Fed's Z.1 Flow of Funds, showing mortgage debt rose $99B in Q4 while debt as a share of GDP sits at 43.8% (vs a 73.1% housing-bust peak) and homeowner equity at 71.3%, evidencing large equity cushions. This recurring framework underpins McBride's repeated thesis that any 2026 price softness won't trigger cascading distressed-sale declines. Useful structural reference on household balance-sheet health (CR's own MEW estimate is paywalled).
Using the Fed's Q1 Z.1 Flow of Funds data, McBride shows mortgage equity withdrawal turned negative as mortgage debt grew only $38 billion, with mortgage debt at 43.4% of GDP (vs 73.1% bust peak) and homeowner equity at 71.6%. The framing of equity cushions and the recurring MEW analysis is a useful explainer tying household balance sheets to housing-bust risk. ---
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Structural mechanism explainers: the FHFA National Mortgage Database quantifying the rate lock-in (why sub-4% borrowers won’t list, and how time is slowly eroding the constraint), builder sentiment and single-family starts at a turning point, and the conforming-loan-limit mechanism most coverage treats as a black box.
Quarterly look at the distribution of rates on outstanding mortgages, documenting the lock-in mechanism: the share of loans under 4% peaked at 65.1% (now 55.2%) and under 5% at 85.6% (now 73.3%), while loans over 6% rose to 17.2%. This is the core explainer for why existing inventory stays historically low — homeowners won't trade a sub-4% loan for a 7% one — making it a useful reference on the rate lock-in effect.
A genuine opinion/essay post: reacting to Logan Mohtashami grading spring housing an 'A,' McBride lays out a stakeholder-dependent framework—transactions-based observers (agents, escrow, appraisers) face a bust (2024 was the worst sales year since 1995), so he grades existing-home an 'F' and new-home a 'C+.' The framing that 'good for some stakeholders is bad for others' and that more inventory can reduce rather than boost transactions gives it transferable analytical value.
NAHB builder sentiment fell to 32, the third-lowest reading since 2012, with a record 37% of builders cutting prices and the NAHB now forecasting a 2025 decline in single-family starts. McBride links falling builder confidence to coming single-family starts weakness and lays out the squeeze on builders from rising inventory, resale price declines, buyer hesitancy, and cost/margin pressure. A turning-point read on homebuilding, more than a bare data print.
An evergreen explainer of how the Fannie/Freddie conforming loan limit (and FHA limit) is set, the post details the FHFA Q3-over-Q3 expanded-data HPI mechanism, the HERA rules, and the fact that limits never ratchet down (CLL was frozen at $417k from 2006-2016). Estimates only a slight 2026 increase given slowing price growth, with the official figure due late November. Useful reference-grade walkthrough of a mechanism most coverage treats as a black box.
Distribution of outstanding mortgage rates from FHFA's National Mortgage Database, documenting the rate lock-in effect: loans under 4% peaked at 65.1% in Q1 2022 (now 50.6%) and loans over 6% rose from 7.3% to 21.9% by Q4 2025. McBride's key analytic point is that time is steadily eroding the lock-in, a structural driver of low existing-home inventory. Useful reference on the mechanism that has constrained the housing market for years. ---