Across these pieces Cochrane treats "Fed independence" not as a slogan but as a contested boundary between central bank and Treasury that only holds if the Fed retains the right to say "no" — above all the right to refuse war-finance debt monetization in the next major crisis. He reads the proposed new Fed-Treasury Accord through the lens of the original 1951 Accord (the Fed reclaiming, not surrendering, its independence), gives a fiscal-theory account of how Korean-War inflation rose and vanished without a Volcker-style recession, steelmans the case that independence should be paired with a narrow accountable mandate, and maps the entire current research frontier on independence, fiscal dominance, and dollar dominance. The cluster matters because it locates the real threat to price stability in the fiscal-monetary boundary rather than in interest-rate tactics.
TIER 5
Nov 23, 2025
Cochrane's full WSJ op-ed argues Trump's three monetary desires are not crazy: that persistently lower rates may not raise inflation much (citing empirical near-zero responses and the New Keynesian long-run implication that lower rates eventually lower inflation, plus Japan/ZLB evidence); that Fed independence is not an absolute virtue and should be paired with a narrow accountable mandate; and that 'exorbitant privilege' can be a resource-curse when the bounty is consumed not invested. A sharp, original contrarian framing that steelmans positions while rejecting tariffs and capital controls.
monetary policyinterest ratesFed independencereserve currencyNew Keynesian
TIER 5
Feb 16, 2026
Drawing on Hetzel-Leach's narrative of the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord, Cochrane gives a fiscal-theory reading of why Korean-War inflation surged (prospective WWIII deficits, price-control and rationing fears) and why it vanished without a Volcker-style rate spike or recession (the war-escalation odds fell, a one-time fiscal shock yielding one-time inflation, echoing 2021-22). He extracts a forward-looking lesson: the real test of Fed independence is whether it will refuse war-finance debt monetization in the next major crisis (Taiwan, war). A landmark historical-analytical piece with lasting reference value.
Fed independence1951 Accordfiscal theoryinflation historywar finance
TIER 5
Feb 17, 2026
Cochrane reframes the proposed new Fed-Treasury Accord (per Warsh's comments) as the opposite of Fed capitulation: invoking the 1951 Accord signals the Fed wants the right to say 'no,' shrink its footprint, and preserve independence. He lays out a concrete three-item agenda: Treasury (not Fed) owns the debt maturity structure with the Fed buying only short-term bonds or lending against collateral; the Fed exits credit allocation like MBS purchases; and both prepare rules for crisis-time debt monetization. A durable policy framework on the fiscal-monetary boundary.
Fed independenceFed-Treasury Accorddebt maturityQEmonetary policy
TIER 5
Jun 2, 2026
A long, co-authored overview essay synthesizing the entire 2026 Hoover Monetary Policy Conference on central-bank independence, fiscal dominance, the dollar's reserve status, mandate/tools, and the AI-boom rate question, with detailed summaries of each presenter (Nelson, Wilcox, Bordo, Eichengreen, Lustig, Krishnamurthy, Redding, Rogoff, Garicano, Duffie, Bowman, Daly, Goolsbee, Waller, Goodspeed). It is a high-density reference capturing the current research frontier on Fed independence, fiscal pressure, dollar dominance, and AI's effect on the natural rate. Durable reference value as a single-document map of the field's leading debates.
central bank independencefiscal dominancedollar reserve statusAI and interest ratesFed balance sheet