Foreign Policy · Ideas & Institutions
TIER 4 Tue, 16 Dec 2025 18:30:15 -0500 (EST)
A look into the daily realities of Chinese soldiers. | | | --- --- --- | | DECEMBER 16, 2025 | VIEW IN BROWSER | DOWNLOAD THE APP --- | | | --- | --- | | _By James Palmer_ Welcome to _Foreign Policy_ ’s China Brief. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army looms large in U.S. military strategy, often portrayed as a rapidly modernizing adversary in a war yet to come. In lieu of our usual news coverage, this week we take a closer look at the lives of ordinary Chinese soldiers. (We’ll return to the experiences of officers in a future column.) _Have feedback? Hit reply to let me know your thoughts._ * * * Life in China’s Army Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops look out from a bus as they arrive at Tiananmen Gate to take part in a military parade in Beijing, on Sept. 3, 2015. Andy Wong – Pool/Getty Images Though most recruits to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are formally conscripts, it has always effectively been a volunteer force. Enlistment is not coercive, and the military has rarely struggled to meet its targets. All university students undergo a brief period of compulsory military training, but it is little more than marching, shouting, and propaganda. The social status of Chinese soldiers has fluctuated over time. Historically, military service was often seen as brutal, dangerous, and unsuitable for civilized men. This was reinforced by Confucian historians, who looked down on those serving in the military, and by proverbs such as, “Good iron isn’t used for nails; good men don’t become soldiers.” After the chaotic period from the 1910s to the 1940s, when China was torn by civil war and foreign invasion, soldiers were seen as little more than bandits in uniform. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s armed forces—which would eventually become the PLA—thus made a deliberate effort to improve their public image. Drawing on Soviet models, the communists sought to transform soldiers into well-disciplined heroes. Propaganda, as well as patriotic wars against Japan and later the United States in Korea, considerably burnished their reputation. That shine took a long time to wear off: After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the military was one of few avenues for young people from rural areas to improve their lives—especially during the Cultural Revolution. But that changed after 1979, when the shift toward opening up began to modernize the Chinese economy. University attendance and urban life offered higher earnings and status than the military, which seemed backward now that the general population no longer had to live under rationing and harsh political discipline. The PLA’s reputation suffered further after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. From then on, there was an unofficial prohibition on soldiers serving in their home provinces, out of fear that they might side with future protesters. By then, the one-child policy had also complicated enlistment, as soldiers faced the dual burden of long deployments and caring for aging parents without siblings to share responsibility. Today, PLA recruitment still largely draws from rural areas, but the military has placed a greater emphasis on education. Two decades ago, more than one-quarter of enlisted men had a ninth-grade education or lower; today, fewer than 4 percent do, and a slight majority have some college education. Recruits are overwhelmingly male, with the proportion of women declining from 5.4 percent in 2000 to just 3.8 percent in 2020. Despite rising youth unemployment, the glorification of soldiers in state media, and competitive pay and benefits, the PLA remains unattractive to many young people. Military life is isolated, restrictive, and tightly controlled. Chinese soldiers weren’t allowed mobile phones until 2015, and they still face higher levels of surveillance and restriction than their Western counterparts. Housing for soldiers has historically been poor, though improving living conditions has been a priority under Chinese President Xi Jinping. (The PLA has at least generally prided itself on the strength of its cooking, with some exceptions.) That said, life on base can be bleak, especially in the isolated border regions where there are few facilities or entertainment options. Marriage for those in the PLA is also difficult. Soldiers sometimes spend as few as 40 days per year with their spouses, and it can take a decade or more to earn the right to live together as a family. Military wives, meanwhile, face restrictions for divorce. These rules, intended to reassure soldiers, instead deter marriage. Daily life for Chinese soldiers—as in any military—revolves around maintenance and training, but there is also emphasis on political education. Commissars oversee troops’ education and morale, as well as monitoring officers for loyalty. In practice, this means a mixture of sports, team-building exercises, and stilted political lectures. My impression from talking with former soldiers and state media military correspondents is that petty bureaucracy and official tyranny are more pervasive in the PLA than in most armies. There is also a persistent culture of graft. The government has targeted grand-scale corruption, but petty schemes—from canteen embezzlement to involvement in organized crime—are still common. Opportunities for advancement in the PLA are limited. China’s noncommissioned officer corps is weak, and promotion to officer rank requires an exam, yet participation has historically been low. Post-service support is also minimal. Unlike the United States, China lacks comprehensive programs for veterans’ education or health care. Many ex-soldiers end up in security work, whether as guards or as “thugs-for-hire.” Local governments are supposed to provide veterans with pensions and reserve posts for them at state-owned enterprises, but they rarely deliver on these promises, which has triggered protests. Veterans of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War are particularly bitter about their lack of pensions and what they see as a wider lack of recognition of a conflict that the government would prefer to forget. Xi’s administration has taken steps to address these issues, establishing a Ministry of Veterans Affairs in 2018 and passing new legislation in 2020 aimed at strengthening veteran support systems. But between the COVID-19 pandemic and the local government debt crisis, these benefits often fall by the wayside. Though reforms have gradually improved conditions for ordinary soldiers, the PLA enjoys far less prestige today than it did in the early years of the People’s Republic. It’s always worth remembering that, despite the careful choreography in military parades or China’s patriotic rhetoric, the ordinary Chinese soldier is still just a guy with blisters on his feet missing his hometown. --- | | | --- | | # Get the daily email that makes keeping up with global news easy --- * FP World Brief: 24 hours in five minutes --- | --- # Reader favorites --- * Weekly IR analysis from the desk of Stephen M. 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