These pieces examine where markets misfire and what fixes them. The congestion piece is a clean lesson in externality pricing — adding road capacity fails because induced demand refills it instantly, leaving congestion pricing as the only demonstrated remedy. The startup-fraud piece frames fraud as a principal-agent problem with negative externalities, amplified by hot markets, founder control, and weak oversight. Both show how structural incentives — not bad actors alone — produce predictable market failures, and how policy (pricing, disclosure) can realign them.
TIER 4
Mar 22, 2026
Explains the Fundamental Law of Road Congestion via Duranton and Turner (2011), whose ~1.03 elasticity of vehicle-kilometers to lane-kilometers means new lanes (and even public transit) fill instantly with induced demand, leaving congestion unchanged. It decomposes the extra traffic (mostly individual driving, some trucking) and concludes congestion pricing is the only demonstrated fix, citing NYC's recent rollout. A clean, well-sourced explainer of induced demand and externality pricing.
congestioninduced demandtransportationcongestion pricingexternalities
TIER 4
Mar 10, 2026
Reviews Dyck, Fang, Hebert and Xu (2026), which assembled 614 venture-fraud cases and found VC-backed firms are 54% more likely to commit fraud than non-VC firms, founder board control raises fraud likelihood 88%, and 'hot' markets and weak investor oversight drive it—while defrauding founders face no market discipline. It frames fraud as a principal-agent problem with negative externalities (e.g., Theranos) and warns the current hot genAI market may breed more fraud, suggesting tighter disclosure rules. A substantive applied-finance piece with timely implications.
venture capitalstartup fraudprincipal-agent problemcorporate governanceexternalities